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The paper discusses two types of problems related to assigning or denying intellectual 
property rights to agro-biotechnological innovations in the relation between developed and 
developing countries. First, protecting property rights on innovations creates incentives 
towards further research and innovation, which in some cases may be beneficial to society, 
in others not so. If the assigning of the right does not guarantee the potential beneficial use 
of the innovation, not assigning rights would not prevent its potentially dangerous 
utilization. Secondly, the power of exclusion of the holder of an intellectual property right 
limits access to the newly produced knowledge: this may discourage the process of 
producing new knowledge, harming developing countries. Moreover the property right 
holder may end up with excessive market power when commercializing the innovation, 
which is also harmful to developing countries. It is shown that these problems cannot be 
solved by denying protection to property rights on innovations, but by improving 
procedures for awarding these rights and accompanying them with appropriate liability 
rules and antitrust measures.    
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Traditionally, intellectual property rights have been considered to be the   
“natural” right of the inventor, to be protected in order to prevent others 
stealing the fruits of the inventor’s research efforts. This vision is often 
countered by an opposing one, which considers it inappropriate to assign 
private property rights to intellectual creations, since, the argument  goes,  
knowledge is a public good which should be freely available to everybody 
for the well-being of human society as a whole. 
 
Recently, protection of intellectual property rights on new knowledge has 
been advocated as the best means to promote technological progress. The  
starting point of the argument is that once knowledge has been produced, it 
can be utilized by everybody at a very low marginal cost. If we consider that 
the costs of  obtaining existing knowledge are “sunk”, and acceding  to new 
knowledge entails paying a price equal to the marginal cost of knowledge 
utilization, this price would not adequately reward the costs of producing 
new knowledge in the future. Knowing that any future research efforts 
would not guarantee appropriate returns will undoubtedly discourage such 
efforts.  
 
Price incentives are not the only type that encourage efforts to obtain new 
knowledge: there are others, such as personal satisfaction, the vocational 
calling to research, social recognition through reward, recognition and 
academic career advancement. But price incentives are important, and they 
can be provided by awarding rights to the intellectual property of new 
knowledge.   
 
Assigning a property right to a producer of new knowledge excludes others 
from utilizing it unless they obtain a license from the right holder, obviously 
at a price. This price must be higher than the marginal cost of utilizing the  
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produced knowledge and high enough to be perceived as an incentive to 
produce new knowledge (Maskus, 2000; Posner and Landes, 2003).  
 
Basically, there are two types of problems to consider. First, the aim of 
protecting property rights on innovations is to create incentives towards 
research and innovation in general; the risk is that this may give vent to 
socially dangerous innovations.  However, in most cases it is not easy to 
establish whether or not an innovation is beneficial or dangerous, especially 
because it may be subsequently utilized in many ways, some of which may 
be beneficial to society, others not so. In this case, if the assignment of an 
intellectual property right does not guarantee the potential beneficial use of 
new knowledge, not assigning rights would not prevent its potentially 
dangerous utilization.    
 
Secondly, the holder of an intellectual property right has a power of 
exclusion which limits access by others to the newly produced knowledge. 
However, the production of new knowledge is very often a process which 
starts from a base of existing knowledge. Hence, discouraging access to 
existing knowledge also means discouraging the process of producing new  
knowledge. Paradoxically then, in protecting intellectual property we 
obtain the opposite result to the one expected and desired. Moreover, the 
holder of an intellectual property right may end up with excessive market 
power when commercializing the innovation.  
 
Applied to biotechnological innovations, these two types of problems 
emerge in all their complexity, involving in particular relations between 
developed and developing countries. They will be discussed in the following 
sections, with particular reference to agro-biotechnologies. I will try to show 
that these problems cannot be solved, as sometimes is suggested, by denying 
protection of property rights on innovations, but by improving the 
procedures for awarding these rights and accompanying them with other  
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measures such as liability rules governing potential damage and also 
antitrust measures.  
 
2. Social costs and benefits of biotechnologies, and protection of 
intellectual property rights.        
 
Nobody doubts that biotechnology is currently one of the most important 
expressions of technological progress. As  is well known, it embraces all 
technologies that use molecular and cellular biology for solving problems 
linked to agriculture and food, as well as human health. Medical 
biotechnology has applications both in diagnosis and in producing new 
drugs. Biotechnologies applied to agriculture are used for producing and 
modifying plants, animals and micro-organisms. Plants and animals have 
been modified for the benefit of humankind for hundreds of years using 
conventional methods, such as grafting and selective breeding; 
biotechnology has now introduced an unprecedented qualitative change by  
enabling human beings to transfer genes from one species to another. 
 
A debate is developing on the social benefits and costs of biotechnologies, 
with extreme opposite positions emerging: on the one hand, unconditional 
optimists maintain the widespread belief that technological progress in 
biotechnologies is always good and should be given free  rein to develop; on 
the other hand, unconditional pessimists consider any biotechnological 
innovation dangerous simply because it is the result of unnatural human 
intervention in natural life processes. 
 
These extreme positions are rooted in the premise that general brad-ranging 
propositions will be valid for any type of biotechnological innovation. This 
is simply not the case because the social benefits of some biotechnologies 
are likely to be greater than their social costs; for others, the opposite is 
likely to be the case. This is something not always easy to establish due to 
the high level of uncertainty resulting from a lack of scientific knowledge  
  5
and the fact that most effects of the innovations will only become apparent 
in a  distant future. What should be done is to improve scientific knowledge 
by helping to better understand the effects of innovations and to use   
institutional channels to encourage those innovations which promise to be 
more beneficial and less risky to society. 
 
The most commonly recognized benefits of biotechnological innovations 
are in resource productivity, considered both in terms of higher output per 
unit of primary resources and in a higher variety of outputs. In the case of 
medical biotechnologies, the most important benefits concern the second 
point: for instance, production of proteins for curing and preventing 
diseases, and  therapeutic applications of research using in vitro cultivation 
of stem cells. In the case of agricultural biotechnologies, the most important 
benefits concern both aspects: increase in crops’ yields through better plant 
resistance to adverse factors, and the possibility of producing new plant 
varieties.  
 
The risks and costs of biotechnologies concern their effects on the 
environment  and consequently on human health. Consider as an example 
herbicide-resistant GM plants. Herbicides contained in plants directly and 
indirectly enter the food chain, and can damage human health. Water 
sources are also polluted when herbicides are discharged into them.   
Reducing the first type of negative effects, herbicide-resistant GM plants 
appears to be beneficial to society. But the introduction of such an 
innovation is unlikely to reduce the use of herbicides; on the contrary, 
farmers are likely to use more herbicides to destroy weeds, as they are less 
concerned about the damage produced in the plants they grow.   
 
Moreover, herbicide-resistant genes can cross over to other plants, including 
the weeds that should be destroyed; the risk here is that the creation of 
“superweeds” would entail searching for more powerful and possibly more 
risky herbicides. GM plants could themselves begin behaving like weeds if  
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their new, superior genetic characteristics give them a comparative 
advantage over neighboring wild species (Dutfield, 2004, p.63). 
 
Pest-resistant GM plants are another example of agro-biotechnological 
innovation. They should lead to a reduction in the use of pesticides. 
However, attention should be given to nature’s reaction to neutralize human 
intervention by selecting the most resistant elements in the population 
concerned (Goeschel and Swanson, 2002, 2003, 2004). The defensive 
reaction of pests could  lead to the emergence of “super-pests”, the 
development of which is likely to encourage the invention of new GM 
plants resistant to the new types of “super-pests” or, if research is unable to 
find them, more powerful and potentially dangerous pesticides may be used. 
 
An important and much-debated effect of biotechnologies on the 
environment is on biodiversity. Biodiversity refers to the variety of 
biological species in a given ecosystem, necessary for its functioning. It is 
eventually determined by the stock of genetic material found in the 
ecosystem itself. Biodiversity should be preserved because of its 
information value and because of its insurance value (Swanson, 1997). 
Biodiversity is the result of the whole history of evolution, and offers an 
irreplaceable corpus of information on the possible directions which 
biological activity might take. This information must be screened in order to 
be utilized. Scientific research is essential, but the screening process  can  
also be improved by using “traditional knowledge” gathered by human 
communities in their interaction with the environment. Biodiversity also has 
an insurance value, because it ensures smoother adjustment to the   
negative shocks suffered by an ecosystem. In biological terms, we might say 
that a highly diversified ecological system increases its resilience to shocks; 
in economic terms, we can say that a rich portfolio of biological activities 




Some believe that biotechnological innovations are a threat to the 
maintenance of biodiversity, since they represent a typical form of 
technological progress that substitutes natural capital with artificial capital, 
leading to an increase in biological specialization. Others, on the contrary, 
believe that biotechnology can help maintain and possibly increase   
biodiversity since, through biotechnology, it is possible to transfer 
successful biological strategies between species and thus to obviate the 
erosion of genetic stock that may result from biological specialization.   
 
The obvious question now is the following: how can society ensure that the 
protection of intellectual property rights, by promoting innovations 
unconditionally, does not lead to the introduction of excessively risky and 
socially dangerous biotechnological innovations? 
 
The most frequently used mode of protection for intellectual property rights 
on innovations are patents. In principle, it is possible to prevent patenting 
socially dangerous innovations. This provision is made clear in the Trade 
Related International Property System Agreement (TRIPS agreement),   
incorporated into the World Trade Organization agreements. According to 
article 27.3b, inventions contrary to public order or to ethics, or dangerous 
for the health of humans, the life of animals and plants, or environmentally 
dangerous, can be denied patents. However art. 27.3b specifies that 
countries cannot deny patents for microbiological processes, and this 
amounts in practice to excluding a selective patentability for 
biotechnological innovations. No surprise that this specification has been 
strongly criticized by those opposed to awarding patents to biotechnological 
innovations (Shiva, 2001).  
 
Opponents of patenting biotechnological innovations invoke the 
precautionary principle. Their argument is that when there is any uncertainty 
regarding the effects of the innovation on the environment and on health, the 
innovation should be blocked, until research and science provide more  
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information. This is precisely the case with biotechnological innovations. 
The problem with the precautionary principle lies in interpreting  the 
requirement that uncertain effects should be absent. There is the risk that if 
the precautionary principle is always invoked, there will be no innovation at 
all. To prevent this from happening, a probabilistic formulation of the 
principle should be adopted, requiring that the probability of negative 
effects is shown to be sufficiently low. 
 
A recent example of a wise application of the precautionary principle is the 
Cartagena Protocol on biological safety required by article 19.3 of the 
Biodiversity Convention. In articles 10 and 11, the Cartagena Protocol 
explicitly refers to the principle of precaution, as the basis on which a 
country should adopt restrictive measures against LMO imports, whenever 
there is insufficient scientific information on the product’s potentially 
hazardous effects. Although this example does not refer to patentability, it is 
useful as a constructive application of the precautionary principle, as it 
suggests that, before taking trade restrictive measures, every effort should 
be made to identify and appropriately assess the potential risks and decide 
whether or not any restrictions ought to be placed on developing the 
product. It should be noted that no contradiction exists with the WTO 
agreements, as GATT article XX envisages that certain measures are 
justified when necessary, in order to protect the life and health of humans, 
animals and plants, and to preserve natural resources.  
 
An important aspect to be considered is that awarding a patent does not 
automatically and unconditionally imply the right to transform an 
innovation into a product or a commercial process. Commercial potential is 
a condition for awarding a patent, but that does not mean that commercial 
use is automatically permitted. This will depend on legislation and will   
reflect a society’s ethical values in determining the conditions for a socially 




Moreover, it is important to realize that negative effects are not necessarily 
avoided by prohibiting patents, as this does not imply that an innovation will 
not be introduced and marketed. Without an explicit and enforceable 
prohibition to the introduction and diffusion of a product, biotechnological 
innovations, as any innovation, can be developed and introduced without 
patents. In doing so,  potential negative effects are often concealed. Thus, 
paradoxically, if an invention is introduced and diffused without a patent 
being first awarded, the risk for human health and the environment can be 
higher. 
  
Rather than adopting a general strategy of denying patents a priori, it  
seems more useful to qualify the procedure for awarding them and to 
accompany patents with other measures. Alterations to patenting procedures 
should aim to carefully specify the characteristics of the product or process 
to be patented, and to take account of its potential effects on the biological 
world, on the environment and on human health.  
 
Patents as a tool for stimulating innovations should be accompanied by 
efficient liability systems. Knowing that someone who introduces a 
hazardous innovation will be held liable for any related damage, particularly 
if knowledge about this damage was concealed, is a clear disincentive for 
not revealing all the potential known consequences.  
 
 
3. Intellectual property rights on biotechnologies and excessive 
exclusion  power: a tragedy of anti-commons. 
 
Protection of the intellectual property rights on an innovation always assigns 
a power of exclusion. There are two consequences to consider: one concerns 
the use of the innovation for further research; the other is the restrictions in 
the use of the innovation for commercial purposes. In the first case, the  
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excessive power of exclusion assigned to a right holder may prevent rather 
than promote the production of new knowledge, giving rise to a “tragedy of 
anti-commons” (Heller, 1998; Colangelo, 2004) as opposed to the “tragedy 
of commons” which occurs when there is open and free access to produced 
knowledge, leading to a lack of incentives to undertake efforts to create new 
knowledge.  
 
The problem cannot be solved by denying patentability, but should rather be 
addressed by altering rules for procedures. Consider the example of 
decoding genes or gene sequences. An objection against patentability is that 
decoding is not an invention, but a discovery of something existing in 
nature. This objection does not convince because the novelty in this case lies 
not in what has been discovered, but in the fact that this is being presented 
in such a way that makes further utilization possible.   
 
Another aspect of  patentability should be mentioned. If patenting decoding 
means assigning the patent holder an exclusion right on any possible use of 
the decoded gene or sequence, the risk of preventing the development of 
further research is evident. The excessive exclusion power derives from the 
fact that decoding by itself cannot be immediately associated with a specific 
function; it will have many different potential uses. This is why the US 
Patent Office only grants patents of decoded sequences if applications   
specify which protein the sequences codify, or in the case of virus genome 
decoding, if patent applications specify the function of diagnosing a specific 
illness and therefore of finding a suitable vaccine. In other words, patenting 
covers the discovery only in relation to a specific application that must be 
indicated. This means that the owner of the patent can use property rights 
towards others wanting to use the gene or sequence, only for the specific use 
described in the patent application. Notice that in this way the patenting 
procedure can also ensure that patents do not create conditions for 
excessively risky and socially dangerous innovations. 
  
  11
Consider now the first stage of the production process of genetic material, 
such as genes or DNA sequences reproduced and proteins encoded from 
sequences using genetic engineering techniques i.e. DNA recombining  
techniques. In this case too, the objection raised against patentability is 
that the process obtains something already existing in nature. This objection 
can be countered by using the former argument; moreover, the example can 
be cited of the recognized patentability of chemical substances existing in 
nature and obtained through synthetic processes.  
 
In this case, exclusion power also allows  the patent holder of the technique 
to extend the patent’s right to all the products obtained through that 
technique. This clearly discourages further research. The solution, even in 
this case, is not to deny granting a patent for the technique, but to 
acknowledge the right to patenting different products obtained with that 
same technique, and recognizing the novelty of the intellectual process 
which uses the technique to obtain the new product. Likewise, the patent 
holder of a new product should not have a right of exclusion towards 
innovations that obtain the same product through different techniques. 
 
Moreover, to ensure that research is not negatively affected, the holder of a 
patent on decoding a genetic sequence or on a biotechnology for producing 
a genetic product should not have the right to prevent the use of the gene in 
its natural form for further applications (Correa, 2000, p.181). 
 
To avoid a scenario in which patents interfere with and impede further 
research development,  exceptions can be made for the granting of exclusive 
rights to the patent holder if these exceptions relate to scientific experiments 
derived from the invention. For example, scientific experiments on genetic 
material samples that were deposited together with the patent application. A 
case in point at international level is the network of International 
Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs), which is supported by the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) that  
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together hold the world’s largest ex-situ collection of plant genetic 
resources. These resources are considered as an international public good 
and hence they are made available to researchers in every part of the world 
and all adhere to the restriction that no intellectual property right protection 
may be sought on material received from the IARCs. 
   
One tool used to encourage access to research is the authorization to use a 
patent without the patent holder's own authorization (compulsory licences). 
Compulsory licenses are permitted by the TRIPS agreement in cases where  
it is in the public interest, if the invention isn't being used sufficiently, or if 
the patent holder applies anticompetitive practices that hinder access. They 
also stimulate research aimed at conserving and protecting the environment.  
 
The creation of patent pools has been suggested as a way of overcoming  the 
problem of excessive transaction costs deriving from research activity and 
from protection of intellectual property. These are institutions that 
coordinate the exchange of patents for complementary and related 
innovations, deal with controversies, and exchange information useful for 
further research (Colangelo, 2004). 
 
The effects of limitations on  research from patenting biotechnological  
innovations can be particularly damaging for developing countries, 
because of their lack of scientific, technological and entrepreneurial 
capabilities and their inadequate financial means. 
 
The Biodiversity Convention encourages each nation to develop scientific 
research on genetic resources provided by developing countries with their 
full participation (art.15), favoring access to the technologies that use these 
resources, including those protected by patents and other intellectual 
property rights (art.16) and the creation of structures and mechanisms to 
develop research in the countries where genetic resources are located (art.9). 
The Convention also requires that developed nations put financial resources  
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at the disposal of developing countries so that they can fully sustain the 
necessary additional costs, based on a common agreement (art.20).  
 
The 2001 FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources introduces a 
Multilateral System in order to facilitate access to genetic resources (art.10) 
without cost, or at a minimum cost, in particular for purposes of research 
(art.12). Access to information should always be allowed and those who 
have benefited from it should not be granted intellectual property rights or 
other rights that could limit the further diffusion of resources. 
 
 
4. Intellectual property rights on biotechnology and excessive market 
power. 
 
The second consequence of assigning excessive exclusion power to a patent 
holder is the possibly excessive market power enjoyed when the 
biotechnological innovation is marketed.  This becomes a problem when the 
innovation is recognized as socially beneficial, so that it is in society’s 
interest that the innovation is quickly diffused. The conflict derives from the 
objective need for a low price, while the patent keeps it at too high a level. 
A problem of equity can arise, as in the case of new drugs considered 
essential to cure serious and widespread illnesses, when those who require 
them do not have the income to afford the expenditures imposed by the high 
price resulting from the protection of intellectual property. 
 
The problem does not only occur with biotechnological innovations. One 
way to deal with it could be to act selectively regarding the duration of the 
patent. This is not a particularly advisable solution, as in setting the optimal 
duration of a patent, current consumers’ welfare losses from monopolistic 
pricing should be compared to future benefits for consumers deriving from 
the stream of innovation stimulated by the patent, and these future benefits 
are extremely difficult to quantify.     
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The most advisable way to address this problem is healthy competition in 
research activity for inventions. It is true that the patent imposes entry 
barriers, but it is also true that this stimulates the drive to innovate which 
overcomes these entry barriers through the development of new products 
and techniques to be patented. This is a typical application of the so called 
“Schumpeterian destructive creation” process, when the new inventor is 
able to crowd out the old one (Aghion and Howitt, 1998). What should be 
noted is that there is a relationship between reducing exclusion power from 
research and reducing monopolistic power. It also emerges that procedural 
rules that ensure patentability of new techniques to produce an existing 
product as well as of new products obtained by the same technique, are not 
only as a means to reduce excessive exclusion power from research, but also 
excessive market power associated with the patent.    
 
To better understand this point, consider the example of the so-called 
GURTs (Genetic Use Restriction Technologies) whose most recent version, 
known as “terminator technology” renders harvested seeds sterile and 
obliges farmers to re-buy the seeds from the producer of the genetic 
innovation (Swanson, 2002). The “terminator technology” has been jointly 
developed by the US Department of Agriculture and a major American 
cotton seed producing company (Delta and Pine Land), and the patent was 
jointly granted to both. The effect was quite simply to increase the value of 
seed owned by the US company and to open new markets, especially in 
developing countries (Dutfield, 2004, p.77). It has been argued that the 
excessive market power comes from the fact that  farmers are forced to buy 
their seeds from the same producer. But this is not the true reason. The 
power derives from the monopolistic position of the seeds’ producer. With 
alternative “terminator technologies” available, farmers would have a 
choice, and the market power would be reduced. Within an appropriate 
regulatory framework, patents could provide the incentive for further 
research and achieve more competitiveness.    
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To address the problem of equity, society should perhaps decide to incur at 
least part of the cost that consumers of the patented product or final users of 
patented processes pay as the patent’s rent, thus allowing those who need 
the patented product or process to buy it at a price they can afford. This can 
be obtained at a national level by means of a redistributive  fiscal policy, 
and at an international level by means of conditional transfers from rich to 
poor countries.  
 
In biotechnologies, there are examples of market power that can be 
explicitly addressed with antitrust measures rather than with measures 
acting on patent procedures. Here is an often cited case. Montsanto had 
made huge profits from its own patented herbicide Roundup. Concerned 
with the shortfalls of profits following the patent’s expiration, Montansto 
developed and patented GM seeds containing a gene resistant to Roundup. 
However, the company contractually obliged farmers to buy these Roundup 
Ready seeds together with the patented herbicide. Montsanto denied that its 
objective was to increase the use of herbicides, but conceded that its main 
interest was to ensure that farmers continued to use its own herbicides 
(Dutfield, 2004, p.63). This case typically reveals the existence of a market 
power problem linked to protection of intellectual property granted by the 
patent that should be dealt with by antitrust authorities rather than by patent 
procedures or by patent awarding authorities. 
 
 
5. Patenting biotechnologies and the distribution of benefits to 
developing countries. 
 
Developing countries claim that the distribution of benefits from 
commercializing patented innovations obtained in developed countries 
ignores the role of many developing countries as suppliers of genetic 
resources (the raw materials) for biotechnological innovations. They  
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demand that this role be recognized by redistributing at least a part of the 
innovation rents to them.  
 
They also accuse the present patent system of being organized in such a way 
that returns are only recognized to the final innovation phase, i.e. for   
companies in developed countries. What they demand is that protection 
mechanisms for property rights be revised so as to explicitly recognize the 
role of the initial phase of the entire biotechnological innovation process, 
which involves the supply of primary genetic resources and biodiversity, 
and the contribution of the traditional knowledge of indigenous 
communities and local farmers. 
 
Developing countries also claim that property rights over genetic resources 
are implicitly assigned to those who have an interest in exploiting them, and 
the related biodiversity. Yet this is not necessarily the case. A developing 
country will not necessarily use the shared rent to conserve genetic 
resources and biodiversity, as experience shows.  
 
A more convincing argument is that, if the contribution of traditional 
knowledge in developing countries to the innovations is not recognized, this 
discourages the use and preservation of traditional knowledge, thus 
depriving the human community of the opportunity to make full use of the 
ability to decipher the informational content of biodiversity which the 
indigenous communities and local farmers possess. (Dutfield, 2004, pp.54-
55). 
 
Another convincing argument is that when protection through patents turns 
the farmers in developing countries into providers of free raw materials,  
making them totally dependant on suppliers from industrialized countries 
for basic inputs such as seeds, this reduces their function as potential 
innovators who use local genetic resources. (Shiva, 2001). 
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The positions of developing countries are recognized in international 
treaties. The preamble of the Biodiversity Convention affirms that states 
have sovereign rights on their own biological resources. Yet this is not an 
absolute right as the preamble itself acknowledges, specifying that the 
conservation of biological diversity is a common concern of humankind and 
that states are responsible for conserving their biological diversity and for 
using their biological resources in a sustainable manner.  
 
Art.15 and 19 of the Biodiversity Convention require that the results of 
research and the benefits arising from the commercial utilization of genetic 
resources should be shared in a fair and equitable way, especially with the 
developing countries holding the genetic resources used in the innovation 
process.   
 
The role of traditional knowledge is recognized by the Biodiversity 
Convention, which states that each country should respect and maintain the 
knowledge, innovations and habits of local indigenous communities, whose 
traditional lifestyles are important for the safeguarding and sustainable use 
of biodiversity (art.8).  
 
The FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources explicitly 
recognizes the contribution by the local and indigenous communities and 
farmers, in particular those living where crop diversity originates from, to 
the conservation and development of genetic resources (art.9). National 
governments should take steps to protect and promote the rights of farmers, 
including the protection of their traditional knowledge and the right to 
participate at an equal level in the benefits derived from the use of genetic 
resources. 
 
The FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources also considers the 
above mentioned multilateral system as an instrument whose function it is to 
distribute in a fair way the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic  
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resources (art.10). Those who commercialize genetic material received from 
the multilateral system must pay a sum to be defined by the system's 
governing body as a fair share of the benefits from commercialization 
(art.13). 
 
Problems arise because it is often difficult to find any objective criteria to 
establish how benefits should be apportioned to the countries concerned.  As 
an example, consider the following case. Big profits have been obtained by 
Eli Lilly from two anti-cancer products derived from a plant (Catharanthus 
Roseus) originally found in Madagascar, but existing throughout the tropics 
for long enough to be considered a native plant. Moreover, the ethno-
biological knowledge which attracted Eli Lilly and University of Western 
Ontario researchers came not from Madagascar but from rural communities 
in the Philippines and Jamaica (Dutfield, 2004, p.47). Should benefits be 
assigned only to Madascagar? What criteria should be used in distributing 
and sharing benefits among different countries?  
 
The case just mentioned can be considered a typical example of a 
phenomenon known as “biopiracy”, referring to the fact that many patents 
have been granted for products deriving from genetic resources coming 
from developing countries, without the consent of the owners of the 
resources, or even without informing them (Martinez Alier, 2002).    
The former example also shows how difficult it is to establish primary 
ownership of the genetic resource or of related traditional knowledge.   
 
However this is sometimes possible, and in these cases the discovery of an 
example of biopiracy can be used to unmask the non-novelty of an 
innovation. There have been cases where the patent was revoked on the 
grounds that traditional knowledge already existed on the property of the 
patented innovation (Dutfield, 2004, p.50 e p.53). 
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Difficulties can be encountered within a country in distributing the 
commercial benefits of a patent to individual persons on the basis of their 
role in utilizing traditional knowledge, as such knowledge is normally 
considered common heritage of public domain to which everybody has free 
access. This argument is also used against the use of traditional knowledge 
as a factor determining the distribution of the benefits of patent 
commercialization. The argument goes as follows: if traditional knowledge 
is public domain within the borders of a country, there is no reason why the 
same should not apply outside the country’s borders (Stenson and Gray, 
1997). However, this argument ignores the fact that traditional knowledge 
fell into public domain owing to abuses of human rights towards indigenous 
people who were denied and deprived of individual rights to their 
knowledge without any prior consent (Dutfield, 2004, p.58).  
 
The fact that the right of developing countries to share the benefits of 
biotechnological innovation is acknowledged in international agreements is 
important, but it is only a necessary condition for enforcing such a right. 
Reforms are first of all required in intellectual property laws and in the 
regulatory systems of developed countries.  
 
Many negative effects of patents in terms of excessive exploitation of 
traditional knowledge could be avoided by introducing more rigorous 
procedures to screen patent applications into the intellectual property laws 
of advanced countries. Any application should be required to explicitly take 
into account the pre-existing knowledge on which the patentable innovation 
might be based. 
 
We must always be aware of the strategic aspects which can lead individual 
countries to delay such reforms because of the fear of losing an 
advantageous position in the international market. Only a strong awareness 
of the social benefits of reforms in countries or groups of countries whose 
key role in biotechnology is internationally acknowledged, can change the  
  20
status quo. Such awareness can be achieved through the pressure of public 




Biotechnology is a sector of technological progress destined to become ever 
more important for the future of mankind. However, it is a new technology 
whose uncertain future effects can have a positive or negative sign, 
depending on the type of innovation considered. 
 
The uncertainties of the degree and timing of social costs and benefits 
deriving from biotechnological innovations require particular attention to be 
given to the use of traditional tools for providing incentives for these 
innovations, and in particular the protection of intellectual property, for 
example patents for new inventions. Blocking patentability tout court is not 
an appropriate solution and may indeed be counterproductive. It is 
preferable to act on reforming patenting procedures. It is very important to 
consider that granting a patent does not automatically grant authorization to 
use the patented invention; and that in any case, the procedure for obtaining 
a patent guarantees an element of transparency. However, it cannot be 
denied that a patent as such tends to promote the innovation and is therefore 
a tool which, by its very nature, highlights the benefits rather than the costs 
of the innovation itself. The most expedient approach is to perfect the 
patenting procedures as much as possible, and to accompany them with 
provisions for legal liability and with a better functioning of antitrust rules. 
 
In international treaties and in particular in the Biodiversity Convention, the 
focus is on the need to discourage biopiracy and to encourage developing 
countries that own the genetic resources to participate in research and share 
the benefits of biotechnological innovations, both in terms of participating 
in returns from the innovation allowed by the intellectual property rights and 
in terms of the use of the innovation itself for the purpose of their    
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development. This is no easy task. Developed countries should feel 
responsible for the enforcement of the principles enshrined in international 
treaties by adjusting their own legislation on intellectual property rights and 
on antitrust, so as to prevent protection of property rights from leading to an 
underestimation of the social costs of  innovations and to excessive 
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